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In this paper we present a theoretical framework for the analysis of the economic relevance 
of adaptation as an "happiness engine" in bad health conditions. Positing that for a given 
individual the level of health is quite separate from the degree of adaptation and its effect 
on happiness, we aim to verify if gaps between health and happiness do exist and which 
factors can be connected to them. Having provided a general model of health related 
happiness   determination   structured   on   three   happiness   components,   we  define   the 
adaptation process and the relevance of its monetary and non-monetary costs. We then test 
some features of the model using data from the SHARE survey of health, ageing and 
retirement   in   Europe   (Release   2.0.1,   2007).   We   eventually   conclude   with   some 
suggestions for future research and present a number of actual options for health policy.
Introduction 
In the happiness literature there is a growing body  of evidence about (partial) adaptation to bad 
health shocks/conditions: the corresponding psychological theory, frequently referred to either as 
the set point theory or as the hedonic treadmill, postulates that happiness adapts back to a given 
level of happiness: roughly, the one experienced before the shock
2.
The issue is of paramount importance for  health  economics and for the economics of the law 
because it posits many crucial questions :
· Whose preference is to be used in resource allocation? The general population one 
(supposedly not adapted) or the ill people one(supposedly adapted)?
· How much should we compensate for disability ?Over which time span?
· Are preferences changed by exogenous shocks?
The above puzzles, in fact, are closely linked to adaptation: 
1. Adaptation is the main source of difference between the QALY’s scores stated by 
general population and by ill people: the use of ill people preferences may 
understate the concerns ex-ante about the illness by general population, while the 
use of general population’s scores might not represent the “sufferance burden” of 
a given illness (Menzel et al. 2002).
2. In legal litigations the fact that injured people adapt, can lead to reductions in 
compensations   offered   by   judges   (Bagenstos-Schlanger   2006,   Oswald-
Powdthavee (2006).  
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literature on the psychological constructs that may govern relationships between happiness and 
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2 For the analytical differences between set point theory and hedonic treadmill theory see, 
for example Byrnes-Strohminger 20053. If the happiness is taken as a synonym of utility and the effect on it of an health 
shock is just dependent of time and adaptation, we might   have an in-built 
changing of preference mapping.
The real issue, to our view, is not whether people adapt, but rather how and how much  they 
adapt. In fact, it is natural for every living body to adapt to changed life conditions, but the 
pattern of adaptation may differ between humans and other living entities, and can also differ 
among individuals according to their characteristics and conditions: particularly, state of health.
Our aim is to build a theoretical framework for the analysis of the impact of bad health 
conditions on happiness, taking account of the existence and persistence of adaptation. As far as 
“costs” are concerned, we will try to expose how costs (monetary and non-monetary such as 
cognitive, psychological and physical) may be viewed as relevant in connection with adaptation. 
In fact, as we will try to make clear in the next paragraph , we will propose a notion of 
adaptation considered as the result of a   “costly” procedure. Thus we should model  the 
underinvestment, i.e. the achievement of only a partial adaptation, as partially due to  monetary 
adaptation costs, while there could be an optimal substitution strategy between monetary and 
non pecuniary costs.
Our work will proceed through the following steps. We first present a targeted review of the 
economics and psychology of adaptation. After that we introduce the rationale of the research 
and we make an easy introduction to our model using a Tale. Then we provide a general model 
of health-related happiness determination, stressing happiness components, the analytics of  the 
adaptation process and its costs and some implications of the model. We shall then proceed to 
test some and only some features of the model, using data from one wave of SHARE survey of 
health, ageing and retirement in Europe: this will entail both the definition of a measurable 
notion of adaptation and a tentative (in some cases heroic….) association of other survey 
variables (such as socio-demographic and relationship variables, individual characteristics, type 
and duration of illness, some non-pecuniary costs and a self-reported liquidity constraint as a 
proxy of monetary costs) with the above defined measure of adaptation. We conclude with 
tentative policy indications and with proposals for future research.
Adaptation in health economics and psychology theory
Adaptation is a multidimensional concept; it  is made of many different processes interacting 
each other,  moderated by specific factors and varying with time.
There are at least three different concepts of adaptation. The first is called Cognitive adaptation 
and is focused on three dimensions (Taylor 1983): looking for a reason, effort of control, 
potentiating self-esteem. Cognitive adaptation is also linked to the so called “Principle of 
reduction of cognitive dissonance”, introduced by  (Festinger 1957).
The second concept is the Psychosocial Adaptation,(Bishop 2005) and can be seen as a dynamic 
or “stage   model”(Livneh 2001), built around eight process variables consisting in emotive 
reactions to illness, in turn clustered in three  temporal stages: immediate, intermediate, late 
reactions: 1) Shock, anxiety, negation; 2) Depression, anger, hostility; 3) Knowledge, adaptation. 
To such a model, a number of criticisms have been raised, spanning from the doubtful 
unavoidability of reactions, to the ciclicity and discontinuity of reactions (recurrent models).
The third is called Hedonic adaptation/treadmill and is substantially a blend of physiological 
adaptation such a diminished perception of a stimulus or,say, an increase of muscular mass of 
2arms for a disabled on a wheeling-chair, and of changes in cognitive process, such as values, 
interests, goals 
3. 
Many factors act as moderators-regulators of  adaptation, i.e. as factors magnifying or reducing 
its strength and impact on well-being feelings and health assessment. Among them the literature 
stresses   the   role   of   uncertainty,   of   contacts   with   people   having   experienced   the   same 
illness/shock,  of intrusive  thoughts  and remembrances,  of causal  attribution  (search for 
responsibilities of illness), of the research of a meaning for what happened.
In practice adaptation can be seen as the composition of different  processes: habituation, 
contrast, change of goals, coping
4. The first is reflected in a passive behaviour, driving 
individuals, just due to the elapsing of time, towards the inbuilt set point: in this sense it is a 
time-relevant process. Habituation is a learning process of biological nature, and does not imply 
consciousness , awareness or active choice, (I put my shirt on: after a while I do not feel it 
anymore)
5. On the contrary, a typical short term phenomenon is contrast, consisting in a change 
of significance of some life aspects because of the comparison with other more intrusive aspects 
like  the onset of the illness (after an accident the simple pleasure deriving from daily living is 
enhanced by the contrast with the negative well-being effects of  the illness). Change of goals 
has to do with the reshaping of individual’s goals after an illness, abandoning those that are now 
unattainable, and giving preference to those that can  in fact be grasped. The most studied and 
important   process   though   is   “coping,”   defined   as   an   integrated   approach,   having   both 
dispositional traits (personality of individuals) and context  (contingent strategies). Coping can 
be studied as a problem of: 1) Focus: we distinguish a coping centered on the problem, centered 
on emotions, and seen as an avoidance strategy (denying/avoiding the problem) Zeidner-Endler 
1996, Livneh-Antonak 2000; 2) Dynamic interaction: among personal sources ( we stress the 
role of self-efficacy, of hardiness of optimism and of locus of control), among social sources 
such as social networks and help received both inside the family and outside , and among types 
of  efforts of the individuals; 3) Personality traits: the model of five factors (Zeindler and others 
3 According to Kanehman (2000) in Kanemann-Tversky (2000), phenomena that  would 
normally be explained as due the s.c.   Hedonic treadmill , in the sense   of Brickman and 
Campbell (1971) could ALSO be explained by a different cause that has nothing to do with 
adaption  . That is , while adaption is the main cause of what can be reported as going back to 
the set-point along the hedonic treadmill, the same apparent  result can be explained by what K. 
defines satisfaction treadmill , that has nothing to do with adaptation. Satisfaction treadmill 
produces treadmill effects that are due, however, to a shift in “aspirations” . The point presents 
apparent similarities with the notion of positional goods. Here we will not dwell further on this 
point.
4 A different way of dealing with adaptation is contained in Menzel et al. 2002, that define 
8 costitutive elements of adaptation: 1) Cognitive denial of functional health state, 2) Suppressed 
recognition of full health; 3) Skill enhancement; 4) Activity adjustment; 5) Substantive goal 
adjustment; 6) Altered conception of health; 7) Lowered expectations; 8) Heightened stoicism. 
According to the authors the different elements should be backed by different normative 
considerations.
5 Note, however that the distinction between habituation and adaptation is not, in the literature at large, always so 
neat and clear-cut as it appears from the discussion above.  .Kanehman (2000) in Kanemann-Tversky (2000), to 
recall the notion of adaptation in the sense used by Brickman and Campbell(1971) adopts as an example  ”bathing 
in a warm sea”, that in our view should be considered a physical and physiological automatic  response (untouched 
by volition). We will discuss habituation as physical passive adaptation to bad health on page 16.
31996) looks at Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness as 
stimulators or obstacles to coping; 4) Illness type: chronic conditions are the most studied (a 
model of coping for chronic diseases has been formulated as a cognitive and emotional appraisal 
of   illness characteristics, treatment type, other life circumstances, demographic traits of 
individuals, that interacting with internal and external sources at disposal leads to a coping 
behaviour entailing psychological, social and physical consequences, Lazarus-Folkman 1984)), 
but attention is also devoted to sudden illnesses/accidents and to degenerative illnesses. The last 
two aspects (alone and in interaction) are of great interest when studying the existence of 
adaptation in health field. 
The importance of personality traits is well documented: 1) conscientiousness, seen as a style of 
discipline  and self-control , is associated to illness acceptance and compliance to treatments, 
and has been proven as coping enhancing for kidney diseases and dialysis; 2) neuroticism is 
negatively associated with coping, though the association seems to be dependent on time 
according to an inverse U shape; 3) optimism (in all its dimensions as positive expectations, 
self-confidence, and neglect of negative events) has always a positive effect, proven for diabetes 
(Macrodimitris-Endler 2004), for multiple sclerosis (though decreasing when attacks are 
underway) and for cancer (Carver et al. 2005). 
The literature on the impact of different chronic illnesses and on the successful adaptation 
strategies is far from conclusive: 1) hypertension is successfully associated to two styles of 
coping, monitoring and blunting (Miller et al. 1989); 2) diabetes is closely linked to self-
efficacy, in that it requires self-control (diet, physical activity) to prevent its worsening with time 
(Maddux 1995); 3) the most studied among  chronic illnesses is cancer, characterized by an 
ambiguous prognosis and strong social consequences: at least five different coping strategies 
have been proven their efficacy in some respects:social support, optimism, distancing, cognitive 
or/and behavioral avoidance, and evidence shows that self-efficacy, internal locus of control, 
time since the onset of illness and age are all important explanatory factors; 4) heart attacks 
coping is positively influenced by self-efficacy (less incentive to reducing social activities and 
more rapid recovery), but also a two stage strategy, with denial at first and active problem 
solving later on, seems to be effective; 5) asthma is negatively associated to loss of emotional 
control and on narrow focus on the problem.  Coming to sudden illnesses and accidents we can 
say: 1) in the case of paralysis (Kendal-Buys 1998), social comparison and change of reference 
group is often a successful strategy (a paradox, reported by Buunk et al., 2006 is that sometimes 
the more the gravity the more the adaptation because individuals are forced to change reference 
group), as is upward identification (my future is like that of individuals with less severe 
conditions) and downward contrast (I contrast my present conditions with those suffered by a 
more disadvantaged group); 2) amputation: looking for a significance and active problem 
solving are the most important explanatory factors, though a change of coping strategies across 
the time is envisaged. Positive individual characteristics such as an internal locus of control, 
self-efficacy, mastery and optimism lead to successful coping, in a first stage through an 
increasing resort to humor and only later on through active problem solving (Dunn 1996). 
Degenerative illnesses such as multiple sclerosis, often associated with strong uncertainty , 
depression, anxiety and distress are hardly amenable to adaptation, though religious and spiritual 
variable are sometimes associated to better results (McNulty et al. 2004). Finally, there are 
works (Oaksford et al. 2005) studying the effect of the exposition to multiple stressors: the main 
findings are that the benefits of such complexity are the increased resiliency ( capacity to absorb 
or resist to shocks, disturbance, insult : in some way a notion of psychological “elasticity” of 
personality , and capacity to transfer acquired coping competences among different illnesses ), 
4the increased mobilizing of resources (already available when a new illness come), the increased 
reappraisal (perception of own coping ability), while the costs of such complexity are a 
stereotyped coping, fatigue, helplessness, behavioural constraints,  limited  reappraisal (inability 
to understand menaces).
To   our   knowledge,   the   less   developed   theoretical   field,   due   to   its   complexity,   is   the 
measurement   of   adaptation.   Up  to   now   the   efforts   of   measurement   have   been   mainly 
unidimensional, focusing on the residual gap in (only) one of the following dimensions: 
pathological traits of personality (anxiety, depression), physical/beavioural components of 
illnesses, functional performance, grade of acceptance of illness
6. In principle and from our point 
of view  the measurement of adaptation could be pursued by computing the success in filling the 
gap between happiness and  health
7: in the next paragraph we will dwell on this issue. 
The rationale of our research
First of all we want to be clear about our perspective on the term  and the notion of Adaptation. 
We derived our notion reflecting upon some of the main commonsense meanings  of the word 
and “adapting” this to our particular context: that is, casting  the notion as an operative concept 
having drawn its components from  fragments of the semantics of commonsense and of  relevant 
psychological theories. These latter we surveyed in the last section. For the semantics of 
commonsense we asked ourselves: what do we talk about when using the word “adaptation”, 
“adapt” ? So we looked up the Dictionaries: first the Vocabolario della Lingua Italiana (Istituto 
della Enciclopedia Italiana - Treccani 1986), second we cross-checked   with the Oxford 
Dictionary  (these meanings  correspond, besides, to those assigned to the word “adaptation “ as 
derived from “adapt” in the cited reference).
Among the first three meanings ranked in order, number one  refers: to make apt to a particular 
scope, make suitable to or for a purpose (same as in the Oxford Dictionary). As examples: make 
a room suitable as a study; modify a suit; adapt music to a text…Number two refers to : set 
something in an appropriate manner. As examples: set the shield at the arm; glasses on the 
nose…Only in the third   place we find the meaning   as:   to accustom (biologically or 
spiritually ), to habituate (also in the Oxford Dictionary)  to given conditions of environment, 
life, reality, reducing progressively  one’s own reaction or resistances to these conditions. At the 
end , in a restrictive sense of the third meaning is also mentioned : to resign oneself, to submit, 
to accept the inevitable without repining ( Oxford Dictionary).
Now in this summary exposition of our frame of reference on the “commonsense” meanings of 
the term, it is in strong evidence a notion of “adaptation” that refers primarily to some kind of 
“active” intervention to modify  something or somebody in such a way as to make it appropriate 
to some purpose or scope or function. While the meaning/notion  of “adaptation”  in the sense of 
“habituation” or “submission” are assigned  a  secondary role. For the former, in the absence of 
6  A more complex strategy could consists in computing a multidimensional measure, 
focusing on the health/well being domains still affected by the illness and on their relative 
importance for the individual. Among the domains often studied we find psychological well-
being, physical well-being, social-interpersonal and materialwell-being, occupation, physical 
functioning: this is the case for the IIRS index (Illness Intrusivity Rating Scale) based on 13 
domains (Devins et al.1983).
7  We shall give shortly our definition of adaptation, making also clear the difference 
between our definition and that of Borghesi-Vercelli (2007) that  in quite a different framework, 
suggest the importance of distinguishing the  objective  level of health from the  subjective 
assessment of happiness.
5intervention, inactivity or the “natural” state of things would not allow to reach  the scope. This, 
consequently, implies  to recall some idea of “ opportunity-cost”, in as much as resources  could 
need to  be used in the “ active “ intervention. This line of reasoning has led us to propose a 
notion of “adaptation” that distinguishes itself sharply from “habituation”, although we will 
allow the latter a relevant role in our model essentially trough the role of “time”, because of its 
emphasis on a inner content of “betterment” to modify what otherwise would be unsuitable or 
not satisfying. The notion of adaptation/ habituation  is mainly used when we face an happiness 
increasing event: winning a lottery, marriage, etc. In the case of a negative shock, such an illness 
it is just a sum of fading away sufferance and  of naturally increased tolerance for the illness. We 
call  adaptation  rather, any activity, entailing  effort,  fatigue and costs, that is directed to a 
contrast to the illness and to a speed-up of recovery, either physical or psychological. A way to 
conceptualize adaptation is to use the well-established health production function. For a generic 
individual i (i is not reported for ease of notation) ,we have:
) , , , , ( ) , Pr , , , , ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 t t t t t t t t t t t t t Ada Hab Gen Ed HS g H Gen ev Con Env HS SH f H = = + - - - - -
The onset of illness  at period t , that is the  health status at t, is characterized by a function of the 
current health shock SH, and by arguments of the previous period: HS are health services used 
in the past, Env are the environmental factors, Con are the consumption habits, Prev are the 
prevention actions and Gen are the genetic inbuilt endowments
8. The after care period, the 
health status at t+1, is  a simple function of the health services utilized when ill, a function both 
of the compliance and of his ability to utilize the health services, proxied by his level of 
education Ed, of the inbuilt genetic capacity of reaction of the individual, of passive habituation 
to the condition  Hab  and of a factor  Ada, namely adaptation,  including all physical, 
psychological and monetary adaptation efforts of the individual.
The main hypothesis we set  forth is that not only the above HS, Ed, Gen, Hab, Ada, factors 
have a different productivity in terms of health gains, but also that they behave very differently 
from the point of view of their impact on the happiness of the individual: adaptation, to our 
view, may have a lower productivity in terms of health gains than HS but it nonetheless has a 
very high productivity in terms of gains in happiness ( we will give our definition of happiness 
later on).
The above hypothesis is coherent with the observation that shocks in health conditions such as 
disability, do not reflect in appreciable fall of happiness: individuals having strong adaptation 
activity could not solve health problems (as measured by physical and physiological data)  but 
they could overcome them, by regaining an acceptable level of happiness .
Though adaptation could be rather happiness enhancing, it is nonetheless costly, both in the 
efforts it requires and in terms of unsatisfactory health gains. Sometimes adaptation efforts have 
a direct money cost, in other cases  a money equivalent of efforts can be obtained (giving a value 
to time lost in adaptation activity); finally, it should be considered that using time and resources 
in adaptation activities could imply an opportunity cost of adaptation in terms of the benefits 
forgone if those time and resources would have been alternatively used directly in health 
services. The individual is then confronted with a choice: is the marginal cost of adaptation 
lower or equal to its marginal utility? 
8 The genetic endowment considered here is only considered relavant in the production of 
“health” and does not coincide with the genetic factors that are considered, in happiness 
literature, as the main determinants of individual’s  level of happiness or set point (according to 
the review by Lyubomirsky et al. 2005 about 50% of the so called chronic happiness level is 
genetically determined)
6“Aglio, olio e peperoncino” as a metaphor of adapted happiness: the story
We want to tell you a story:
Jack is a rich young man, active and quite happy. On November, Friday 13, a bad car accident 
brings him in intensive care unit. When he wakes up he discovers having lost many of the legs 
and arms functionings. They tell him he will recover 20% of previous abilities but it will take 
time…
After a first period of absolute depression, he realizes that he has to fight if he wants to recover 
a sense of dignity and of interior calm.
He was an amateur cook, and he loved italian “pasta aglio olio e peperoncino”: he used to 
fetch hot pepper from a plant he was growing on his balcony, but among the other things he has 
lost there is the ability to open the window himself. If he wants to continue to eat the pasta, he 
has two alternatives: either to ask someone to buy the hot pepper for him or to try to overcome 
his inability.
The first alternative is a low cost one, and it satisfies entirely his feeling of taste: the hot pepper 
bought is satisfying for quality and the pasta is good.
The second alternative is rather messy: for a while he cannot eat what he would like to, he has 
to do tiring and costly exercises, may be he faces deception. But, at the end, with the hot pepper 
in the hand he could feel happy for having succeeded, and, of course, the pasta would taste very 
good.
If the first alternative gives the same utility and is less costly than the second one why should 
Jack follow partially or totally the second alternative?
Our answer is (obviously) that the second alternative must contain more utility than the first: 
although “more costly” it can therefore be rationally pursued. In our example the hot pepper 
bought and the one grown   are different in substance (or characteristics in the sense of 
Lancaster), in that the first does contain only a “feeling” component, while the second contains 
both the feeling and the “will” component: the latter confers to the picked hot pepper a greater 
utility/happiness.
It is now three years since the accident occurred. Jack has acquired the predicted 20% of 
previous abilities: he is rather satisfied and he is finding a sense to his bad luck. Sometimes he 
thinks back to the first period of his disability, when he was striving for opening the window: a 
warm sense of satisfaction flows when he reminds of the first time the hot pepper of his balcony 
gleamed in his hand.
He is quite happy.
The model
The model is as follows: let’s define happiness as a threefold concept. 
The first aspect of happiness has to do with  the pursuit and attainment of will: people strive to 
obtain something, they are happy when they succeed in
9; but even if they don’t succeed in fully 
attaining their will they still retain some degree of  positive feeling for the sake of it. Recently 
Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) termed “intentional activity” an argument very similar to the one we 
set forth. Attainments  may be seen as  causing a flow of positive feelings (happiness), that we 
call HF1: such a flow is then a function of a (either partly or fully) successful undertaking, like 
9 In the words of Emmons (1986), individuals whose life satisfaction is high “perceive 
their strivings as important, valued..”. See, for this citation: Mehnert, Krauss, Nadler, Boyd 
(1990)
7gaining love, money, glory, but also attaining capabilities  such as  mobility, ability to use and 
do  things properly (such as caring after oneself, dressing, cooking, washing  by himself, etc 
after an accident).  Adaptation, to our view, is  strongly linked to that aspect of happiness: 
people whose health has been damaged strive to get back to their old level of physical and 
psychological abilities and capabilities.
The second aspect of happiness,  has rather to do with feelings of well being (named H2). Every 
individual tries to enjoy his life, organizing it in order to be satisfied and rewarded. Illness 
breaks this, by reducing, because of its impact, the stock of well being opportunities, WBO, 
available to each individual in a given moment: we call this process depletion of well being 
opportunities.  Adaptation affects  this  well being aspect in a negative way, because performing 
an adaptation activity causes monetary and non pecuniary costs: the WBO stock may then 
decrease, because of adaptation costs; nonetheless, if adaptation activity reduces the impact of 
illness on well-being opportunities it has also a positive effect.
The third aspect of happiness has to do with  thoughts, or  remembrances of past positive 
experiences: every past attainment, springing up from past H1 , deposits in the mind, and can be 
recalled. The  act of recalling  implies positive feelings connected to the establishment and 
maintenance of personal identity, a sense of affirming oneself through temporal continuity, 
bolstering self-esteem and coping with negative experiences: this act we can call (Bryant et al. 
2005) positive reminiscence or H3. We assume that only past H1 can be recalled easily, while 
past H2 flows away without marking the mind. Setting the point back has partially to do with 
this aspect of happiness, in that reminds become an inbuilt feature of individuals, and affect 
future response to life shocks, fostering adaptation.
Define the first component of happiness (the will aspect,) at time t as:
( ) t t AA t FG FG f H / 1 D =
( ) kmt t Ill g FG =
( ) zt pkt t AA ICh AA h FG , = D
( )






, 1 =       1.
In the above equations, we observe that health related happiness flow of type 1 H1, i.e. 
happiness   springing   from   the   process   of   will   posited   as   adaptation,   is   a   function   of 
FG FGt AA / D 10, the last notation to be intended as the  success in contrasting  the “functioning 
gap” (FG) generated by the illness (Ill) of type k and gravity m, i.e. the reduction in usual 
abilities and capabilities of the individual.   t AA FG D   is a function of   pkt AA , that is the 
Adaptation Activity, of type p, for the illness k, performed by the individual, and of individual’s 
characteristics (ICh) of type z
11. By substituting  FG FGt AA / D  in H1, we get the final function 
1.
We make assumptions on the derivatives of function 1. with respect to AA:
10  The absolute value notation was chosen because it makes possible to use either a 
positive (increase in health difficulties) or a negative metric (loss of health/quality of life) to 
measure the functioning gap.
11 In principle, the function h could contain both an intercept effect, due to the very fact of 














































































We assume that an increase in adaptation activity, brings about a success in reducing the 
functioning problems   and increases H1 but at a nearly constant rate, as we assist to a 
compensation of diminishing marginal returns to AA in closing the functioning gap and to 
increasing responsiveness of H1 to the degree of success. 










individual characteristics  can affect H1 in both directions, positively and negatively. A 
discussion on the likely effect on this component of individual characteristics  will follow after 
the model .
A special discussion is due for the effect of illnesses on the functioning gap. We could make the 
hypothesis that specific dimensions of health as related to quality of life are responsible for the 
functioning gap, namely mobility, ability to perform usual activities, etc. while some others are 
only affecting other aspects of well-being feelings (pain, anxiety, ecc.)
12. In this respect some 
types of functioning limitations are more easily contrasted with adaptation, while some others 
are unresponsive to adaptation. In our opinion this is mainly connected to different prospects 
(prognosis) of the illness. We shall discuss this issue later on.
Coming to the  second component of global happiness, namely well-being feelings H2, that is 
the feeling of satisfaction and enjoyment of life, we can model it in the following way:
) (
, , ,



















































































t AA t HS t kt t t t t
WBO
WBO
FG FG FG AA q r H Inc s WBO m H , , , ), ( ) 2 , ( 1 2 1 1  
3.
12 Alternatively, we could hypothesize that all the dimensions of HRQL are involved: an 
usual measure of utility, as QALY’s could then be used to measure the impact of the illness on 
the functioning gap
9We see
13 that H2t is a positive function of the stock of well-being opportunities available at the 
end of previous period WBOt-1 , a negative function of two  coefficients of depreciation  t 1 b  and 
t 2 b .   t 1 b   depends   on   income   variations   Inc D   -   that   could   be   represented   by 




kt t t + - - - = D   , in which w is the daily salary, DLt  work days lost 
because of illness,   
M
kt CAA is the monetary cost of adaptation activity for the k type illness, 
M
kt CHS  is the monetary cost of health services, V is any exogenous variation of income - and it 
depends also on the flow of well-being in the previous period.  t 2 b  is a function of Illness’ 
gravity and type reflected in the FG term defined before and in the success in contrasting it due 
to both Adaptation Activity ( FG AA D , already defined) and to the health services utilized (
FG HS D )
14. Adaptation activity, moreover, is costly in terms of pain, effort, and many other 
non-pecuniary components (p=1,2,..) namely physical activity, psychological activity and time 
costs); we call the cost of adaptation activity 
P
kt CAA  and its effect runs through an increase in the 
depreciation rate  t 2 b  
15. 
Finally, there is a direct effect connected with the problem of the “reference group”. Our 
assumption is that when an individual is struck by an illness he experiences a “shift” relevant in 
two aspects. In the first aspect the illness imply a shift in the category  connected with the 
dichotomy healthy-unhealthy
16 . The second refers to the fact that within the unhealthy specific 
illness group our individual may confront his actual WBO as he perceives it, with what he thinks 
may be the typical WBO for that type of illness. Individuals realize they have a “new” WBO, 
and confront this with the typical WBO of people with the same illness. They will be more 
happy if they have a WBO greater than the typical one. The effect is simply modeled as a ratio 
between the current stock of well being opportunities and the expected stock of a representative 
individual of the same reference group  A
tk WBO : a ratio greater than 1 implies a positive effect on 
actual well-being, while the opposite is true for ratios less than 1
17. 
13 We could substitute FG and  FG AA D  by the functions defined before.
14  FG HS D  can be assumed to be a function of  HS and ICh, as adaptation activity
15 From a theoretical point of view, illness’ impact and the contrasting actions could also be modeled in a different 
way. We could think to the effect of illness on well-being as mainly expectations’ driven; in this case the individual 
compares his expected QALY’s at the onset of illness (ExQALYs) and after any contrasting action ( ExQALYs D ) 
with the expected QALY’s of an individual with his same characteristics but enjoying full health FHExQALYs. We 
have: 
FHExQALYs
ExQALYs ExQALYs D +
- 1 . This approach is more hard to treat because of high data requirements.
16 We will not dwell further on this point. It implies a discussion of what we call the 
“handicap   problem”   (mainly   connected   with   the   homogeneity   of   happiness   in   making 
interpersonal comparisons in different health conditions), an issue that deserves an in depth 
analysis that we reserve for another work.
17 The crucial point is how the individuals set their expected values on 
A
tk WBO . We are 
conscious that our treatment of reference group effect is here analytically poor: in principle the 
typical value could be measured as an average taken from   the scoring system adopted for 





























































































































































































































According to the last condition, adaptation activity affects H2 in a threefold way: 
(i) Negatively, through the monetary costs of adaptation that deplete the WBO stock (first 
term in square bracket);
(ii) Negatively, through the non-money costs of adaptation, and their effect on WBO stock 
(second term in square bracket);
(iii) Positively, thanks to the success of adaptation in contrasting the well-being effects of 
illness (third term)
(iv) Possibly positively by changing the reference group
18.
More tentative is the analysis of second-order effects: increasing returns are often compensated 
by decreasing returns, and there are also constant returns; probably the constant return 
hypothesis (linear relationship) could be accepted as a first approximation. 
The third component of global happiness is  H3, due to the flow of pleasant thoughts generated 
by the Happiness stock that accumulated in the years for every successful attainment, as a 


















i t t t H v p H
1
1 3      5.
The function v is probably  a decreasing parameters one, in that the effect of past attainments 
fades away for distant periods, while the function p has probably, together with the moving sum 
of k last years’ attainments, a constant term measuring the “cornerstone” successes of past life; 
we assume that:
group effect in the empirical specification.





























Let’s summarize now. Global Happiness HAP:
( ) H3 H2, H1, HAP q =       7.
How our story is linked to the model we just sketched?
Suppose Jack  chooses the alternative: buy the hot pepper. We see that the accident had depleted 
his stock of well being opportunities WBO (ability to eat pasta aglio, oglio e peperencino), but 
he may react increasing again his stock, rapidly and at a very low cost, by substituting grown up 
hot pepper with bought hot pepper: this entails only an effect on H2 component, in that the 
functioning gap of H1 is unaffected and there is no happiness H3 because there is nothing to 
recall after three years.
Suppose Jack chooses the second alternative: the H2 component for a while stay very low, 
because the well being opportunities stock is still depleted, but after a costly and a long 
adaptation, he succeeds in counteracting accident’s effect on WBO. Moreover he succeeds also 
in reducing the functioning gap, raising happiness due to H1 component, and after three years he 
has a warm flow of happiness H3 from the recall of the success in adaptation.
The choice to adapt was the right one in terms of happiness: of course his health will lag for the 
remaining of his life behind his happiness. The more he chooses to adapt the more the lag. 
Implications
The model proposed entails some consequences:
· Ad-happiness: adaptation and the production of happiness.
Individuals, by their very nature,  tend to contrast illness or disability. The issues at stake 
are then: could we predict the amount of effort made by individuals? Do they perform 
AA up to the full cancellation of the negative impact of the illness on happiness? Is there 
full adaptation? By deriving the global happiness with respect to the adaptation activity 
AA, we get:















































































































































The interpretation of the equation is as follows:
1. the first term in the right hand side is a benefit of AA through H1, and has 
a positive sign, in that the more adaptation activity the more the reduction in the 
functioning gap (positive sign, second derivative), the increased contrast of the 
functioning gap increases happiness flow H1 (positive sign, first derivative) that in 
turn increases general happiness;
2. the second term in the right hand side is the effect of AA on H2 through 
its costs and its productivity: we have already discussed the signs. The first two 
12terms (parenthesis) in the square bracket represent the cost of adaptation activity 
and have negative impact on H2 and on HAP, while the third term in square 
bracket is positive; the global effect of AA is uncertain (may be negative);
3. the third, forth, k terms in the right hand side, finally, have each a positive 
sign, in that they represent the past effects of the successful reduction of 
functioning gap due to the adaptation activity (positive fourth derivative), the 
following effect of this reduction on the past happiness flow H1 (positive third 
derivative), the subsequent positive effect of the increased past happiness flow H1 
on the stock of happiness (positive second derivative), the positive effect of the 
increased stock on the remembering possibilities (positive first derivative) and the 
increased general happiness.
Maximization of HAP, after the illness shock has occurred, requires that we equate the 









































































































































The above condition can be interpreted as: the individual  should equate at the margin the 
costs of adaptation activity (right hand side) with the benefits (left hand side). The 
problem is to understand: 1) if there is any certainty that the equilibrium position is 
reached   and   the   level   of   adaptation   activity  implied   by  the   above   condition   at 
equilibrium;  2) if there is any room for a policy intervention leading individuals towards 
their optimal level of adaptation activity.
The first point has to do with time and with different types of illnesses. In our 
specification there is not  any certainty of the attainment of the equilibrium: for some 
illnesses whose impact remains stable in time (see next paragraph) the longer lasts 
adaptation, the higher is the marginal benefit of successful adaptation activity (because of 
H3), the higher is the probability that, beginning from a situation in which marginal costs 
were higher than marginal returns, we reach the equilibrium: beyond that point there is 
no further incentive to adaptation activity. We predict that adaptation activity comes to 
an end. For some other illnesses, worsening in time, the more the passing of time the 
worse the benefits of adaptation: increasing costs and decreasing benefits may reach an 
equilibrium only if costs were lower than benefits at the beginning. 
The second point is a policy one. Costs are a key variable in the equilibrium conditions 
and they are in part policy determined. In fact as compared to health services’ 
consumption that is frequently publicly provided (at zero monetary price on the point of 
services or with a relatively low copayment), adaptation activity appears neglected. As 
adaptation activities costs are mainly faced privately by individuals, there seems to be a 
policy bias towards the most effective (HS>AA) policy tool in terms of health and 
against the least effective (AA>HS) policy tool in terms of happiness. 
· Illness’ type and gravity and adaptation
In principle, we expect that some kind of illnesses are suitable for a contrast with 
adaptation activity, while for some other any effort of adaptation, if ever undertaken,  is 
destined to be unsuccessful.
The analytical effect of illnesses on happiness is:














































































































































In the preceding condition the first term on the right hand side represents the effect of the 
illness on happiness of type 1 through the Functioning gap: the more important the 
illness and its gravity the greater the functioning gap and the lower the happiness flow, 
given a certain level of contrast of it.  The second term on the right represent the effect of 
the illness on happiness  through the channel of well-being opportunities: the double 
negative effect is due to the income-effect of illness (a reduction of days of work) on the 
depreciation rate  1 b , and to the functioning-gap effect on the depreciation rate 2 b . The 
last t-1 terms on the right represent the negative effect on happiness due to the remind-
flow of  sufferance , malaise, etc. due to the past illnesses.
We can usefully distinguish at least four typical illnesses, with different implications 
regarding the adaptation activity needed to face them
19:
1. Once for all Impairing Illnesses (OAII): accidents, and disability generating 
illnesses are the main components of this group, characterized by a once for all 
health shock (paralysis, amputation). This is to say that we have a once for all 
decrease of functioning FG, constant depletion  2 1 , b b  of opportunities WBO, 
and also a probable once for all shift in the reference group leading to changes in 
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. Adaptation activity can contrast the  FG  (we assumed 
constant marginal returns). The more  FG D  approaches  FG , the more it causes 
costs that probably worsen H2 component through the depletion of WBO. Last to 
discuss is the effect of successful AA on the building of the happiness stock HS, 
and then on the recalling function H3: we believe that, given the long period 
required to adapt, the effects on H3 are lasting, though spread in the future. 
Graphically: 
19  We recall that though we acknowledge that habituation and adaptation are closely 
linked, nonetheless the automatic nature of the first makes its cost negligible, while the 
intentional activity needed for the second requires important costs that are (excluding cases of 
grave lack of information) predictable but  far from automatic.
14At time t the impact of illness is on the three dimensions of H1, H2 and H3
20. The 
adaptation take place between the period t and t+n, the H1 improves, as does H3, 
while H2 worsen: the global effect is represented by the ticker line. Given the 
above elements we predict that the effect of AA for OAII  is quite high leading to 
a level of happiness sufficiently close to that (SP= set-point) experienced before 
the onset of the illness.
2. Ever   Increasing   Depletion   Illnesses(EIDI):  included   in   the   group   are 
degenerative illnesses as sclerosis, cancers with unhappy prognosis, and most of 
the illnesses leading to death. A characteristic of the EIDI is that both  FG  and 
WBO worsen in time so that the AA needed to face   the illness is always 
increasing, though progressively less fruitful (   FG D   as a share of   FG   is 
declining in time). We could say that there is not an “adaptation period” n: rather 
a never-ending struggle.
20 The latter is influenced probably more gradually
15Moreover, the reference groups’ effect is not working, because there is no stable 
group to which compare himself and the likely impact of AA on H2 (through 
WBO) is increasing in time as more effort and resources are needed. Finally, 
these illnesses are not associated with a success, so that there is not an increasing 
stock of happiness H3 in formation and recalling activity adds sorrow to life 
rather than happiness
21. The picture shows that the effect of illness itself is to 
decrease happiness in time, while adaptation has still an initial positive effect on 
H1, though diminishing in time, and a diminishing one on H2 and H3: the final 
effect on happiness is driven by illness and the thickest line HAP is decreasing.
We predict in fact that such illnesses are not associated with increases in 
happiness though AA could in principle be high and costly: people experiencing 
such illnesses tend to have low happiness levels and to discourage himself; in 
some cases AA may drop to zero and death may be desired.
3. Recovery Ilnesses (RI): these is the typical group of acute illnesses, that come to 
an end and are followed by a full recovery. The transitory nature of such illnesses 
simplify the activity needed to face them: their only impact is through the 
reduction of WBO and H2. There is no change in reference group nor heavy 
investment in AA (though some short term activity is needed). May be the facing 
of the illness is encompassed in the mind, rising HS and H3, at least in the short-
medium term
22.
4. Random Hitting Illnesses (RMHI): mainly chronic illnesses with sudden acute 
episodes, as in the case of hearth attacks.  This group is a blend of OAII and RI. 
The basic chronic illness is faced with AA, with a high degree of adaptation, 
21 In fact, by adding a decreasing yearly H1 (due to the worsened closure of functioning 
gap) to a decreasing parameter function, the final effect is a diminishing one
22 Overcoming a grave acute illness leads to a more positive attitude towards life.
16while the acute episodes are faced with additional AA. The main difference with 
the pure OAII case is in the psychological impact of the acute attacks: if the 
satisfaction and certainty of recovery prevails
23, via the effect of HS and H3, we 
expect such individuals to be happier than the individuals hitted by OAII,  if to 
prevail is the fear and negative expectation about next sudden attack the global 
happiness is expected to be lower than in the case OAII.  We predict that, for 
such individuals, the infra-group variability in happiness score is the greatest, 
and that shifts in happiness scores are unforeseeable.
· Of individuals’ characteristics
The analytical effect of individuals’ characteristics in the model is very similar to that of 
adaptation activity, with the difference that, pertaining to inbuilt features of the individual, 
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We expect that the main channel through for individuals’ characteristics to affect happiness 
is a cognitive-behavioural one, via their effect on H1 and H3, while the contrast to the 
reduction in well-being opportunities, being mediated mainly by the improvements in 
physical health dimensions may, in some cases, be negligible.
According to the literature we recognize that among individuals’ characteristics more 
conducive   to   happiness   the   optimism,     openness,   conscientiousness,   agreeableness, 
extraversion, while neuroticism should have a negative effect.
Verifying the theory
Specification
A provisional attempt to verify the theory is based on the following steps. First, we do not 
dispose of any information on direct adaptation activity as such, so we cannot test neither its 
amount nor its responsiveness to costs. Nonetheless, if we are ready to assume that indirect 
informations on adaptation can be guessed by both happiness function and health function, we 
can proceed with the analysis. Let’s consider conditional distributions of happiness and health: 
our analysis will be confined to potentially adapting/adapted individuals, i.e. individuals that we 
suppose may be performing/have already performed some unknown type and amount   of 
adaptation activity
24. 
23 The fear associated with new episodes is lower if the recovery from a preceding episode 
has been full and sufficiently rapid.
24  We assume in our empirical analysis that all individuals experiencing illnesses or 
disabilities are candidates for adaptation and  do perform some amount of AA: we can then treat 
the variable AA as a discrete random variable assuming the value 1.
17We can write, starting from equation 7 representing global happiness function, the conditional 
function: 
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In 8. call AD.Happiness the happiness conditional on Adaptation activity, and AD.Health the 
same for health. Do consider that we dispose only of cross-sectional data
25: we cannot consider 
any past variable such as WBO, H2, H1. We should, moreover, express health components such 
as:  t HS t AA t kmt FG   , FG   , FG   , Ill D D  with measurable items blending at time t initial illnesses, 
disabilities, symptoms and the effects on health of contrasting actions such the effects of health 
services utilized and of adaptation activity. We add a further impossibility: we are at the moment 
unable to take account of our notion of “reference group” effect
26, as expressed for each 
illness/disability group by the ratio between the individual and the average WBO sets. Coming 
to income variation, we are not able to measure it correctly because we could not compute the 
monetary costs of health services, and because we have only used an approximate ordinal 
measure for the monetary costs of AA. Finally, we consider individual characteristics relevant 
from the point of view of health (socio-demographics) to be a subset of those relevant for 
happiness.
The restrictions we have now mentioned imply that we can estimate only a limited portion of our 
original model: we can then write a more compact version of the above functions (8.):
AD.HAPPINESS*=f(Socio-Demographici,   Relationship   factorsj,   Individual   Characteristicsk, 
Adaptation costsz , Ad-Health)+ e
AD.HEALTH*=g(Socio-Demographici,   Chronic   Illnessesm,   Disabilitiesn,   Symptomsp,,, 
Adaptation costsz)+ v  
As a second step we assume that the same unknown amount of adaptation activity, after 
controlling for some covariates, has different effects on happiness function and on health: as we 
said in page 4, we believe that adaptation has a greater productivity or success in terms of 
happiness than in terms of health. Let’s now define the success in (active) adaptation as the 
difference between self- reported happiness score and self-reported health score : the greater the 
difference the wider the success of adaptation. For us adaptation widen ( increases) the gap, 
partially or totally, between health conditions, as subjectively assessed,   and happiness 
conditions as expressed by individual evaluations contained in reports
27. Our empirical task in 
this paper will be to asses which factors/variables are positively or negatively associated with 
such a success. Our test is then to be viewed as an assessment of factors helping/damaging 
successful   adaptation:   individual   characteristics,   illnesses   types,   illness   duration,   costs 
(approximated) of adaptation.
To be more precise, the idea behind such a metric is the following. Assume that the negative 
impact of an illness on health conditions (as stated in the survey responses) remains stable or 
25 See the paragraph of data
26 See p. 7
27 Thus differing, among others,  from Borghesi, Vercelli 2007, that seem to consider health states  physiologically 
defined as objective measures of (un) happiness and individuals’ responses (assessed directly or indirectly) as 
subjective measures of (un) happiness.
18just slowly decreases over time because of physical adaptation and habituation
28.Assume also 
that the negative impact of the same illness on happiness (as stated) , because of  physical, 
cognitive and behavioural adaptation, is either lower or faster decreasing over time as compared 
to that on health. The difference in scores gives a broad idea of, at least, cognitive and 
behavioural adaptation, that we call active adaptation. It should be noticed that our measure of 
results of cognitive/behavioural adaptation works even with illnesses that are worsening in time: 
in such a case adaptation cannot prevent health conditions and happiness from worsening, but 
possibly adapted happiness worsen less than health. 
Let’s now compute AD.HAPPINESS* – AD.HEALTH*: by substituting adapted health in the 
adapted happiness function, we get:
AD.HAPPINESS*– AD.HEALTH*=f[…, g(….)]-g(…..) + z
We derive the expected results of adaptation activity by looking at the likely magnitudes of 
adaptation effects on the two functions: as an example, if there is active adaptation the negative 
impact of health factors affecting g(..) on happiness is attenuated  with respect to their negative 
impact on health: the resulting function will then show  positive  coefficients for Chronic 
Illnesses, Disabilities and Symptoms. 
In particular:
AD.HAPPINESS* – AD.HEALTH* = h(Socio-Demographici, Relationship Factorsj , Individual 
Characteristicsl, Adaptation costsz, Chronic Illnessesm, Disabilitiesn, Symptomsp) + z
The coefficients of Socio-Demographic variables will be positive if their impact on happiness is 
higher with respect to their effect on health; the coefficients of Relationship factors and 
Individual Characteristics variables are just only those expected from the estimate of happiness 
function alone. Coming to the coefficients of Adaptation costs,  they will be positive if their 
negative impact on happiness is lower than their negative impact on health [f(-) – g(-) with 
ǀg(-)ǀ>ǀf(-)ǀ=+]: this is the case probably for physical and non pecuniary costs (fatigue, effort, 
etc.), while the reverse may be true for monetary costs, affecting mainly happiness and to a 
minor extent health. Finally, we expect that the coefficients for Chronic Illnesses, Disabilities 
and Symptoms, negative for happiness but lower in absolute value than for health will be 
positive, resulting from f(-) – g(-) with ǀg(-)ǀ>ǀf(-)ǀ=+.
A positive coefficient for health variables implies then active adaptation, while a negative 
coefficient implies lack of active adaptation.
Moreover if we add to the specification the variable “Time since the health shock occurred”, we 
have:
AD.HAPPINESS**=f(Socio-Demographici, Relationship factorsj, Individual Characteristicsk, 
Adaptation costsz , Time since health shockv , Ad.Health)+ e
AD.HEALTH**=g(Socio-Demographici,   Chronic   Illnessesm,   Disabilitiesn,   Symptomsp, 
Adaptation costsz Time since health shockv)+ v
The elapsing of time can be assumed to produce habituation, namely passive physical adaptation 
to bad health conditions: if we can safely assume that the passive elapsing of time has just a low 
impact on happiness  while it has a stronger effect on self-assessed health  (see for a test of 
elapsing of time on health Wu , 2001), then if the elapsing of time has a positive effect on 
health, we expect a negative coefficient for the time variable of a specific illness, while the 
reverse is true for a negative effect of time on health conditions, i.e. for illnesses that increase 
their gravity.  We will compute the ** version in our second specification. 
28 We are assuming that the illness is either a chronic one, or implies disabilities, such that 
a “cure” cannot bring to a full recovery, and to perfect health.
19Data
The Data base utilised in the empirical analysis is the first wave (version 2.0.1) of the SHARE 
Survey of health, ageing and retirement in Europe, an inclusive cross-section sample
29 of people 
aged over fifty in many European countries (www.share-project.org)
30. This survey permits to 
analyze all the factors specified above (we shall give a detail of the variables used discussing the 
results of econometric analysis): a preliminary stage is the construction of the dependent variable 
Adaptation=Ad.Happiness-Ad.Health. Having in the survey the happiness variable a four item 
coding
31, while health variable has a five item coding
32, we first homogenize the two by joining 
in a same category the two answers very good-good for health conditions.
We then selected, in the sample of people aged over fifty, all individuals experiencing an illness 
or disability: we coded  increased happiness and health variables from 1 to 4 (lower values 
correspond to lower happiness and lower health) and we subtracted health code from happiness 
code. The resulting variable assumed to represent adaptation has the maximum value of 3 - very 
satisfied with life (4) minus very bad health (1) - and its scale is an interval one, irresponsive in 
the parity cases to the absolute levels of the different variables. A further restriction - being 
interested in  adaptation among ill people - is that we dropped all cases in which health is better 
than happiness, i.e. negative values of the generated dependent variables.
Results
The estimating method is an usual ordered probit, obtained by a linearized version of the above 
defined equation: we assume that the values of the dependent variable obtained represent an 
ordered discrete categorical variable. The results of the first specification are reported below
33:
29 We began the empirical analysis when only SHARE longitudinal data were available. 
We are considering the possibility of  further testing the model with the now available panel 
data.
30 This paper uses data from Release 2.0.1 of SHARE 2007. The SHARE data collection 
has been primarily funded by the European Commission through the 5th framework programme 
(project QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the thematic programme Quality of Life). Additional funding 
came from the US National Institute on Ageing (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 
AG08291, P30 AG12815, Y1-AG-4553-01 and OGHA 04-064).  Data collection in Austria 
(through the Austrian Science Foundation, FWF), Belgium (through the Belgian Science Policy 
Office) and Switzerland (through BBW/OFES/UFES) was nationally funded. The SHARE data 
collection in Israel was funded by the US National Institute on Aging (R21 AG025169), by the 
German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development (G.I.F.), and by the 
National Insurance Institute of Israel. Further support by the European Commission through the 
6th framework program (projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT-2006-062193, and COMPARE, 028857) 
is gratefully acknowledged. The SHARE data set is introduced in Börsch-Supan et al. (2005); 
methodological details are contained in Börsch-Supan and Jürges (2005).
31 The happiness variable is more precisely a life-satisfaction one: the question is framed 
“How satisfied are you with your life in general?”, and the possible answers are: Very satisfied, 
Somewhat satisfied, Somewhat dissatisfied, Very satisfied. To the possible objection that 
satisfaction does not coincide with happiness, we observe that no  data connecting directly 
happiness and health were available to us. Moreover, the correlation between life satisfaction 
and happiness in other surveys (ESS version 2, scores from 0 to 10 for each variable) appear 
satisfactory (though with exceptions such as Italy) reaching a value of 0.55 (Italy excluded),.
32 Very good, Good, Fair, Bad, Very bad.
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       /cut3     3.090084   .1186907                      2.857455    3.322714
       /cut2     1.923514   .0989905                      1.729496    2.117532
       /cut1     .5924931   .0955116                      .4052938    .7796923
                                                                              
        q3cd     .1789374   .0387531     4.62   0.000     .1029828    .2548921
 new_co007_1     .1390585   .0571887     2.43   0.015     .0269708    .2511463
   new_q34r5     -.671332     .31904    -2.10   0.035    -1.296639   -.0460251
     ac002d3    -.1091292   .0488792    -2.23   0.026    -.2049306   -.0133279
        q2fd    -.1745669   .0428076    -4.08   0.000    -.2584682   -.0906656
        q2jd    -.2130506    .044503    -4.79   0.000    -.3002749   -.1258263
        q4ad    -.1375558   .0622245    -2.21   0.027    -.2595136    -.015598
     maxgrip    -.0096114   .0015089    -6.37   0.000    -.0125689    -.006654
        q2gd     .1554394   .0397173     3.91   0.000      .077595    .2332838
     phactiv     .3824946   .0456587     8.38   0.000     .2930052     .471984
        q4nd    -.1117011   .0364329    -3.07   0.002    -.1831082    -.040294
     nb_help     .0578503   .0152206     3.80   0.000     .0280185    .0876821
        q2ad     .2188027   .0431533     5.07   0.000     .1342237    .3033816
    symptoms     .0860921   .0104219     8.26   0.000     .0656656    .1065186
        q4dd    -.1159528   .0402053    -2.88   0.004    -.1947538   -.0371518
      aiufam     .1623854   .0445502     3.64   0.000     .0750686    .2497022
        q4hd    -.2831152   .0620026    -4.57   0.000     -.404638   -.1615924
       eurod     .0339751   .0084313     4.03   0.000     .0174501       .0505
 new_ep005_2    -.3864747   .0624262    -6.19   0.000    -.5088279   -.2641215
    numeracy    -.0696928   .0158896    -4.39   0.000    -.1008358   -.0385498
    ph006d14     .1878715   .0863612     2.18   0.030     .0186065    .3571364
    ph006d13    -.2870831   .0518744    -5.53   0.000    -.3887551   -.1854111
        q4jd      .110179   .0493733     2.23   0.026     .0134091    .2069489
 new_ep005_1    -.1136038   .0398177    -2.85   0.004     -.191645   -.0355626
   new_q34r6     .4839676   .1425858     3.39   0.001     .2045045    .7634307
 new_dn014_1     .1045198    .037911     2.76   0.006     .0302155     .178824
new_isced_r2    -.1327517   .0400506    -3.31   0.001    -.2112493   -.0542541
    ph006d07     .1967337   .0612548     3.21   0.001     .0766764     .316791
        q2hd     .1082916   .0442786     2.45   0.014     .0215072    .1950761
        q2id     .2010971   .0394477     5.10   0.000      .123781    .2784132
        q4md      .106225   .0446458     2.38   0.017     .0187209     .193729
 new_co007_3    -.1782387   .0406773    -4.38   0.000    -.2579648   -.0985126
    ph006d02    -.0711301   .0336333    -2.11   0.034    -.1370503     -.00521
    ph006d01     .0975102   .0406749     2.40   0.017      .017789    .1772315
  new_q38_a1     .2491428   .0423866     5.88   0.000     .1660666    .3322191
   new_q34r1     .1047668   .0402365     2.60   0.009     .0259047     .183629
                                                                              
    piufeleu        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -4454.9712                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1097
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(36)     =    1097.73
Ordered probit regression                         Number of obs   =       6151
33 We used a backward stepwise approach, so that the included variables are only those 
significant at the 5% level, among the  many more encompassed in the original specification. 
Not significant, first stage, variables’ coefficients may represent the theoretical case of very 
close effects of such a variable on both happiness and health. Further specifications, differing 
only for the treatment of the variable education (expressed as less than 10 years of education), 
very similar to those proposed, are available upon request.
21The second specification, instead, gives the following results:
                                                                              
       /cut3     3.077731   .1190681                      2.844361      3.3111
       /cut2     1.913069   .0994906                      1.718071    2.108067
       /cut1     .5800467   .0959821                      .3919253     .768168
                                                                              
 new_co007_1     .1473387    .057267     2.57   0.010     .0350975      .25958
    symptoms     .0848407   .0107434     7.90   0.000      .063784    .1058974
        q2jd    -.2115282   .0445613    -4.75   0.000    -.2988666   -.1241897
     nb_help     .0568604   .0152361     3.73   0.000     .0269981    .0867226
        q4dd    -.1188049   .0402687    -2.95   0.003    -.1977302   -.0398796
       eurod     .0347576   .0084526     4.11   0.000     .0181907    .0513244
new_isced_r2    -.1307351   .0401645    -3.25   0.001    -.2094561   -.0520142
    numeracy     -.069837   .0158981    -4.39   0.000    -.1009968   -.0386773
      aiufam     .1509896   .0447002     3.38   0.001     .0633789    .2386003
 new_co007_3    -.1902327   .0408061    -4.66   0.000    -.2702113   -.1102542
   new_q34r1     .0990236   .0404264     2.45   0.014     .0197894    .1782578
   new_q34r6     .4672072   .1428402     3.27   0.001     .1872455    .7471689
        q4jd     .1154537   .0494193     2.34   0.019     .0185937    .2123136
        q2id     .2013146   .0395472     5.09   0.000     .1238036    .2788257
     maxgrip    -.0100543   .0015185    -6.62   0.000    -.0130305   -.0070782
    yph009_8     .0065859   .0020216     3.26   0.001     .0026236    .0105482
        q4ad    -.1257419   .0623453    -2.02   0.044    -.2479363   -.0035474
    yph009_6    -.0069008   .0028977    -2.38   0.017    -.0125801   -.0012215
        q2hd     .1050565    .044334     2.37   0.018     .0181634    .1919496
 new_ep005_2    -.3701145   .0623324    -5.94   0.000    -.4922837   -.2479452
        q2gd     .1518565    .039776     3.82   0.000      .073897     .229816
     phactiv     .3752123   .0457453     8.20   0.000     .2855531    .4648715
     ac002d3    -.1098273   .0489482    -2.24   0.025    -.2057639   -.0138907
    ph006d14     .1924812   .0865784     2.22   0.026     .0227906    .3621718
    ph006d13    -.2877995   .0521785    -5.52   0.000    -.3900674   -.1855316
        q2ad     .2103334   .0433076     4.86   0.000     .1254521    .2952148
        q4nd    -.1075574     .03644    -2.95   0.003    -.1789785   -.0361363
   new_q34r5    -.7055464   .3230605    -2.18   0.029    -1.338733   -.0723596
 new_ep005_1    -.1145293   .0398724    -2.87   0.004    -.1926777   -.0363808
    ph006d08    -.1778889   .0512508    -3.47   0.001    -.2783387   -.0774391
    ph006d07      .185991   .0632203     2.94   0.003     .0620815    .3099005
    ph006d06     .1579343   .0757699     2.08   0.037      .009428    .3064406
        q4hd    -.2929226   .0621753    -4.71   0.000    -.4147841   -.1710612
 new_dn014_1     .1044734   .0379518     2.75   0.006     .0300891    .1788576
        q4md     .1031871   .0447458     2.31   0.021      .015487    .1908871
        q2fd     -.174542   .0428935    -4.07   0.000    -.2586117   -.0904722
    ph006d01     .0900703   .0407389     2.21   0.027     .0102235    .1699172
  new_q38_a1     .2491088   .0425591     5.85   0.000     .1656945     .332523
        q3cd     .1775601   .0388884     4.57   0.000     .1013402      .25378
                                                                              
    piufeleu        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -4447.6137                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1112
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(39)     =    1112.45
Ordered probit regression                         Number of obs   =       6151
 We also tried a third and a fourth specifications with country indicator variables included 
34:
34 The omitted country is Israel. We also drop Denmark for estimation problems.
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       /cut3     3.041872   .1149595                      2.816556    3.267189
       /cut2     1.861584   .0943313                      1.676698     2.04647
       /cut1     .5159223   .0907479                      .3380597    .6937848
                                                                              
        q2ad     .2036281   .0437519     4.65   0.000     .1178759    .2893802
        q4hd    -.2840395   .0618402    -4.59   0.000    -.4052441   -.1628349
        q2hd     .1628827   .0426628     3.82   0.000     .0792651    .2465002
    symptoms     .0832136   .0104485     7.96   0.000      .062735    .1036922
     nb_help     .0587138   .0152282     3.86   0.000      .028867    .0885605
      aiufam     .1813898   .0446871     4.06   0.000     .0938046     .268975
     maxgrip     -.009591   .0015108    -6.35   0.000     -.012552     -.00663
       eurod     .0333346   .0084396     3.95   0.000     .0167933    .0498759
 new_co007_3    -.1823859   .0408456    -4.47   0.000    -.2624419   -.1023299
    numeracy    -.0637848   .0156548    -4.07   0.000    -.0944676    -.033102
     phactiv     .4134892    .045698     9.05   0.000     .3239227    .5030556
    ph006d13    -.3100814   .0520444    -5.96   0.000    -.4120865   -.2080763
        q3cd     .1786839   .0386855     4.62   0.000     .1028617    .2545061
        q4md     .1490553    .043387     3.44   0.001     .0640183    .2340923
   new_q34r6     .4140114   .1426172     2.90   0.004     .1344868    .6935361
 new_dn014_1     .1175611    .037939     3.10   0.002      .043202    .1919203
        q4nd    -.1125944   .0365674    -3.08   0.002    -.1842652   -.0409237
    ph006d07     .2138394   .0615743     3.47   0.001      .093156    .3345229
 new_co007_1     .1269327   .0575717     2.20   0.027     .0140942    .2397712
 new_ep005_2    -.3069911   .0560552    -5.48   0.000    -.4168572   -.1971251
        q2cd     .1623215   .0650044     2.50   0.013     .0349153    .2897278
        q2id     .1968527   .0394445     4.99   0.000     .1195428    .2741625
    ph006d02    -.0696556   .0338447    -2.06   0.040      -.13599   -.0033212
    ph006d01     .1163675   .0407405     2.86   0.004     .0365177    .1962174
  new_q38_a1     .2183421   .0408247     5.35   0.000     .1383272     .298357
        q2jd    -.1664432   .0447976    -3.72   0.000    -.2542448   -.0786416
new_count~11    -.2026049   .0948146    -2.14   0.033     -.388438   -.0167717
new_count~10    -.5200648    .148222    -3.51   0.000    -.8105746    -.229555
new_country9    -.2413612   .0962605    -2.51   0.012    -.4300283   -.0526942
new_country7    -.5793829   .0684701    -8.46   0.000    -.7135818   -.4451841
new_country6     -.438261   .0493035    -8.89   0.000    -.5348941   -.3416279
     ac002d5    -.1041757     .05117    -2.04   0.042     -.204467   -.0038844
        q2fd    -.1666935   .0429545    -3.88   0.000    -.2508828   -.0825041
        q4dd    -.1114174   .0404281    -2.76   0.006     -.190655   -.0321798
   new_q34r5     -.789163   .3136763    -2.52   0.012    -1.403957   -.1743688
        q4ad    -.1438249    .062398    -2.30   0.021    -.2661226   -.0215271
                                                                              
    piufeleu        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -4410.6563                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1185
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(36)     =    1186.36
Ordered probit regression                         Number of obs   =       6151
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       /cut3     3.052916   .1157076                      2.826134    3.279699
       /cut2     1.871736   .0951779                      1.685191    2.058281
       /cut1     .5199652   .0915335                      .3405628    .6993677
                                                                              
   new_q34r5    -.7840966   .3163241    -2.48   0.013    -1.404081   -.1641127
    numeracy    -.0636164   .0157084    -4.05   0.000    -.0944042   -.0328286
   yph009_15     -.003491   .0014876    -2.35   0.019    -.0064065   -.0005754
        q4hd    -.2820585   .0621491    -4.54   0.000    -.4038686   -.1602485
        q3cd     .1848228   .0389007     4.75   0.000     .1085788    .2610667
     ac002d5    -.1169547   .0512989    -2.28   0.023    -.2174988   -.0164107
        q4dd    -.1091332   .0406479    -2.68   0.007    -.1888015   -.0294649
   yph009_10    -.0131474   .0062439    -2.11   0.035    -.0253853   -.0009095
    yph009_9     .0092216   .0041095     2.24   0.025     .0011672     .017276
    yph009_8     .0066975   .0020627     3.25   0.001     .0026548    .0107402
        q2hd     .1528255   .0428159     3.57   0.000     .0689078    .2367431
       eurod      .032304   .0084644     3.82   0.000     .0157142    .0488938
        q4ad    -.1386974   .0627006    -2.21   0.027    -.2615883   -.0158065
    symptoms     .0844029   .0108588     7.77   0.000     .0631201    .1056858
 new_co007_1      .131976    .057673     2.29   0.022      .018939     .245013
     phactiv     .3985135   .0459416     8.67   0.000     .3084696    .4885575
    yph009_1    -.0055215     .00265    -2.08   0.037    -.0107154   -.0003277
     nb_help     .0602012   .0152451     3.95   0.000     .0303213     .090081
    ph006d13    -.3237851   .0525378    -6.16   0.000    -.4267572    -.220813
 new_ep005_2    -.2917212    .056171    -5.19   0.000    -.4018144    -.181628
        q2fd      -.15774   .0430474    -3.66   0.000    -.2421112   -.0733687
    ph006d10     .2307767   .0790248     2.92   0.003      .075891    .3856624
    ph006d09    -.1913024   .0725381    -2.64   0.008    -.3334745   -.0491303
    ph006d08    -.1316426   .0519271    -2.54   0.011    -.2334178   -.0298673
    ph006d07     .2066881   .0617772     3.35   0.001      .085607    .3277692
        q2ad      .203087   .0440583     4.61   0.000     .1167344    .2894397
        q2cd     .1745099   .0651741     2.68   0.007      .046771    .3022488
        q4nd       -.1064   .0366654    -2.90   0.004     -.178263   -.0345371
        q4md     .1440227   .0434713     3.31   0.001     .0588205    .2292249
   new_q34r6      .400814   .1429372     2.80   0.005     .1206622    .6809657
    ph006d01     .1807407   .0536489     3.37   0.001     .0755909    .2858906
  new_q38_a1      .208904   .0416191     5.02   0.000      .127332     .290476
        q2id     .1937666   .0396693     4.88   0.000     .1160162    .2715169
new_count~11    -.2062468   .0949009    -2.17   0.030     -.392249   -.0202445
new_count~10    -.5230573   .1487573    -3.52   0.000    -.8146163   -.2314983
new_country9    -.2557759   .0966194    -2.65   0.008    -.4451465   -.0664053
new_country7    -.5941977   .0690253    -8.61   0.000    -.7294848   -.4589106
new_country6    -.4551384   .0499158    -9.12   0.000    -.5529716   -.3573053
     maxgrip    -.0096117   .0015222    -6.31   0.000    -.0125952   -.0066281
      aiufam     .1802307   .0449871     4.01   0.000     .0920576    .2684037
 new_dn014_1      .124977   .0381011     3.28   0.001     .0503002    .1996538
 new_co007_3    -.1770787   .0409926    -4.32   0.000    -.2574227   -.0967347
        q2jd    -.1635884   .0448849    -3.64   0.000    -.2515612   -.0756156
                                                                              
    piufeleu        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -4394.1844                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1218
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(43)     =    1219.31
Ordered probit regression                         Number of obs   =       6151
The legenda  of the variables and their effect on active adaptation is as follows
35:
Socio-Demographic Variables:
35 In parenthesis the numbers refers to the specifications in which the variable is present. 
From now on we shorten the term active adaptation using just adaptation. The variables starting 
with New_..are indicator variables and their interpretation is with respect to one or more omitted 
variables, ex. New_q38_a1: the positive effect is with respect to females. The omitted variables 
are: New_co..=refusal to answer or do not know; New_isced_..=more than 10  years of school; 
New_dn..=separated,   single,   divorced,   etc.;   New_ep..=unemployed,   homemaker,etc.; 
New_q34..=Non religious; New_country..=Israel.
24New_q38_a1= Male; Positive effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
New_co007_1= Making ends meet with great difficulty; Positive effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
New_co007_3= Making ends meet fairly easily; Negative effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
New_isced_r2= Education level isced2 (max 10 years school); Negative effect on adaptation 
(1,2)
New_dn014_1=Married and living with spouse; Positive effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
New_ep005_1=Retired; Negative effect on adaptation (1,2)
New_ep005_2=Employed or self-employed; Negative effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
Social support and religious network
Aiufam= Received effective help by family; Positive effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
Nb_help= Number of helps received from outside the family; Positive effect on adaptation 
(1,2,3,4)
Ac002d3= Activity: provided help to family, friends, neigh.; Negative effect on adaptation (1,2)
Ac002d5= Activity: gone to a sport, social or other kind of club; Negative effect on adaptation 
(3,4)
New_q34r1=Religious affiliation: protestant; Positive effect on adaptation (1,2)
New_q34r5=Religious affiliation: muslim; Negative effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
New_q34r6=Religious affiliation: other religion; Positive effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
Individual Characteristics
Q2ad
36=My age prevents me from doing the things I would like to; Positive effect on adaptation 
(1,2,3,4)
Q2cd=I feel left out of things; Positive effect on adaptation (3,4)
Q2fd=Shortage of money stops me from doing the things I want to do; Negative effect on 
adaptation (1,2,3,4)
Q2gd=I look forward to each day; Positive effect on adaptation (1,2)
Q2hd=I feel that my life has a meaning; Positive effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
Q2id=On balance I look back on my life with a sense of happiness; Positive effect on adaptation 
(1,2,3,4)
Q2jd=I feel full of energy these days; Negative effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
Q3cd=I’m always optimistic about my future;  Positive effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
Q4ad
37=I felt depressed; Negative effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
Q4dd=I was happy; Negative effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
Q4hd=I felt sad; Negative effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
Q4jd=I couldn’t get going; Positive effect on adaptation (1,2)
Q4md=I felt tired; Positive effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
Q4nd=I felt really rested when I woke up in the morning; Negative effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
Numeracy= Generated numeracy score; Negative effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
Maxgrip= Generated maximum of grip strength; Negative effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
Phactiv= Generated physical inactivity;  Positive effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
36 All the Q2*d variables are dummies representing the Often and Sometimes answers to 
the question (ex. Q2ad= value 1 if often or sometimes age prevents me from doing the things I 
would like to) 
37 All the Q4*d variables are dummies representing the Almost all the time and Most of 
the time (during the last week) answers to the question (ex. Q4ad= value 1 if  Almost all of the 
time or Most of the time I felt depressed)
25Chronic Illnesses
Ph006d01= Suffering from: Heart attack or other heart problems; Positive effect on adaptation 
(1,2,3,4)
Ph006d02= Suffering from: High blood pressure; Negative effect on adaptation (1,3)
Ph006d06= Suffering from: Chronic lung disease; Positive effect on adaptation (2)
Ph006d07= Suffering from: Asthma; Positive effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
Ph006d08= Suffering from: Arthritis or Rheumatism; Negative effect on adaptation (2,4)
Ph006d09= Suffering from: Osteoporosis; Negative effect on adaptation (4)
Ph006d10= Suffering from: Cancer or malignant tumour; Positive effect on adaptation (4)
Ph006d13= Suffering from:  Cataracts; Negative effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
Ph006d14= Suffering from:  Hip or femoral fracture; Positive effect on adaptation (1,2)
Eurod= Generated depression scale; Positive effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
Symptoms
Symptoms= Generated number of symptoms; Positive effect on adaptation (1,2,3,4)
Time since illness start
Yph009_1=Years since illness start: Heart attack ; Positive effect of habituation on health(4)
Yph009_6=Years since illness start: Chronic lung disease ; Positive effect of habituation on 
health(2)
Yph009_8=Years since illness start: Arthritis or Rheumatism ; Negative effect of habituation on 
health (2,4)
Yph009_9=Years since illness start: Osteoporosis ; Negative effect of habituation on health(4)
Yph009_10=Years since illness start: Cancer ; Positive effect of habituation on health(4)
Yph009_15=Years since illness start: Other conditions ; Positive effect of habituation on 
health(2)
Countries
New_country6= Italy; Negative effect on adaptation
New_country7= France; Negative effect on adaptation
New_country9= Greece; Negative effect on adaptation
New_country10=Switzerland; Negative effect on adaptation
New_country11= Belgium; Negative effect on adaptation
The relative strength of each factor can be grasped if we normalize the coefficients – in order to 
express them in the usual space 0-1 – by dividing their value by the distance between the upper 
and lower cut-points deriving by the ordered probit estimate
38. As an example, take specification 
1: the difference   cut3-cut1=2.4975909 can be used to divide the value of the coefficients. 
Taking for example the effect of the optimism variable Q3cd=I’m always optimistic about my 
future, with coefficient 0.1789374, we have 0.1789374/2.4975909=0.0716: we conclude that 
being optimistic about the future increases adaptation by 7.16 percentage points.
Discussion
The four specifications are somewhat similar: the first and third specifications include, at the end 
of stepwise selection,  36 significant variables, while the second has 39 explanatory variables 
38 Se for the procedure Cutler-Richardson 1997
26and the fourth 43 significant variables (among many more included in the first step): 
specifications 2 and 4  have new variables included to represent pure habituation, i.e. the years 
since illness start, while specifications 3 and 4 include country variables.
The signs are often as expected (with some exceptions):
1. Males adapt more than females;
2. A great deal of illnesses are associated with positive adaptation: Heart attack,  Chronic 
lung disease, Asthma, Cancer, Hip/femoral fracture, while there are some other showing 
negative adaptation:  High blood pressure, Arthritis or Rheumatism, Osteoporosis, 
Cataracts. The rationale for this is that may be the treatment of  high blood pressure or 
the bad expectations  linked to the illness  make difficult  the adaptation,   visual 
impairments  (cataract)  are among  those  difficult   to  fight  against
39,  and arthritis-
rheumatism and osteoporosis are either very painful or socially limiting, without any 
prospect of improvement;
3. The elapsing of time produces  habituation: by looking at the variable time since the 
illness start, we find that it confirms what  we found for adaptation. For Heart attack, 
Chronic lung disease, Cancer, Other conditions, there is a positive effect of habituation 
(elapsing of time) on health conditions, while for Arthritis or Rheumatism, Osteoporosis 
the effect on health is negative; 
4. Being married and living together has a positive effect on adaptation, as expected;
5. Having a mathematical mind is bad for adaptation (numeracy). Apparently a “scientific 
mind” as opposed to a “fideistic mind “ (see also point 11) has more difficulties to 
accommodate  to a situation perceived as “unmotivated”;
6. The more symptoms you have the more you adapt (in line with findings of literature 
about multiple stressors). It appears that, up to a certain limit within a linear analysis, 
there are scale economies in the production of adaptation;
7. Being depressed (Eurod index) seems to be associated positively to adaptation (the 
puzzling result is discussed later);
8. Physically strong individuals adapt less (Maxgrip);
9. Some social activities (giving help, sport/social) are associated with less adaptation. The 
result may reflect a wide range of situations: 1) a selection problem, in that to perform 
such activities you should have a good health; 2) an individual performing social activity 
could have less time to devote to adaptation activity (temporal cost of adaptation); 3) the 
impact of an health shock my be less easily accomodated by more active individuals that 
could use a “backward” looking strategy of coping (among the variables here discussed it 
is here evident the need for a panel data analysis);
10. The help network is important: having received  effective help by the family, and number 
of helps received from outside the family, are both stimulating adaptation;
11. While religious activity is negatively associated to adaptation, praying by yourself is 
good for adaptation;
12. Religion affiliations more conducive to adaptation are:  protestant and other,  while 
muslims adapt less;
13. Making ends meet fairly easily apparently damages adaptation, while Making ends meet 
with great difficulty increases it. It could represent a different attitude of the rich and the 
poor. Suppose two individuals, one rich and one poor, having the same illness: one could 
argue that  more income could induce for the first, better health but not the same for 
39 Of course from a cognitive point of view, being cataract easily cured with surgical 
procedures.
27adaptation; while the lack of income stimulates for the second, will and cognitive 
adaptation . In fact this result may be a composition of two positive effects of income on 
both happiness and health: being the effect of income on health stronger than that of 
income on happiness, the final sign is negative. (we discuss later on a cost variable more 
closely linked with adaptation);
14. Leaving school at young age (14-15 years)  is  a negative factor for adaptation. 
Adolescence seems to be a critical period to start working, renouncing to acquire a 
“technology” of taking care of oneself by education ; 
15. Being employed or self employed   and Being a pensioner are conducive to a greater 
adaptation with respect to other inactive groups: the need for earning  seems to be a 
powerful engine for adaptation, as is an age factor represented by pensions;
16. Physical inactivity is associated with more adaptation;
17. Individual characteristics (variables Q) are the most important explanatory variables in 
the adaptation process: 
a. Positively associated with adaptation are variables expressing good mood and 
expectations, optimism, self-centering, etc: I look forward to each day, I feel that 
my life has a meaning, On balance I look back to my life with a sense of 
happiness, I’m always optimistic about my future;
b. Negatively associated with adaptation are instead variables of depression: I felt 
depressed, I felt sad. The  apparent opposite result of point 7 could be explained 
hypothesizing that the eurod index captures depression as a result of adaptation 
costs (depression as a result of having used too many resources in adapting ), 
while the present variables capture lack of adaptation because of depression 
(depression as a barrier/cognitive cost to adaptation);
c. Many individual answers, point instead uniquely towards an important feature of 
adaptation activity, namely that it is costly in terms of energies and also money. 
This point could be detected in the negative sign of answers such as:  I had a lot 
of energy, I felt really rested when I woke up in the morning, I feel full of energy 
these days, and in the positive signs of: I feel left out of things,  I felt tired, I 
couldn’t get going. This could mean that energy has been burned out in the 
process of adaptation. The money cost is represented by the negative sign of: 
Shortage of money stops me from doing the things I want to do
40;
d. Age burden seems to be associated to more adaptation (Q2ad);
e. An apparently hard to fix contradiction is that happiness experienced in the last 
week seems to be negatively associated to adaptation (Q4dd). According to our 
notion,  happiness is made of three components (H1,H2,H3); we then consider 
that the answer  happiness experienced in the last week  refers only to the 
component H2, being considered just a “feeling” of happiness. In the point a. we 
saw that reminiscences flow of happiness H3 is positively related to adaptation 
(On balance I look back to my life with a sense of happiness). In the case of point 
e. this happiness variable may reflect some sort of hedonic cost of adaptation 
activity: in this respect one could be “unhappy” because he has “adapted” (this 
could   raise   a   methodological   issue:   a  momentary   assessment  method   of 
calculating happiness could give the wrong answers in terms of adaptation, 
showing no adaptation when in fact adaptation is there);
40 Note that this effect qualifies the apparent contradiction due to point 12 on making ends 
meet.
2818. There seems to be a country effect in adaptation: Italy, France, Greece, Switzerland and 
Belgium are countries with relatively low adaptation (with respect with the omitted 
country Israel) while the other countries seem to behave in a similar way as the reference 
country.
Conclusions
Our empirical results seem then to prima facie confirm, what was expected, according to our 
model. 
Personality traits are confirming their importance and often have the expected sign (positive for 
optimism, good mood, etc. and negative for depression).
Illness types are also important explanatory variables, having the expected positive sign for 
hearth attack, chronic lung disease, asthma (RMHI), hip/femoral fracture (OAII-RI), cancer 
(OAII-EIDI), and the expected negative sign for arthritis-rheumatisms, osteoporosis (EIDI), 
while hypertension shows a nature similar to EIDI, probably because of negative expectations.
Adaptation is costly, the costs being either a fatigue-physical costs or a monetary costs
41 or 
hedonic costs: this may lead to underinvestment in adaptation activity if the benefits are 
perceived, because of the illness type or negative personality traits, as possibly lower than costs.
Finally, we tried to test if one of the assumptions of the model, namely that health services are 
less   productive   than   adaptation   activity   in   terms   of   happiness,   is   confirmed   by  data. 
Unfortunately, the metric used for adaptation prevents us from testing the direct effect of 
adaptation on happiness
42. We tested, nonetheless, the direct effect of health services’ use on 
happiness
43, finding that none of the utilization variables shows a significant positive effect on 
happiness
44, and concluding that just a minor effect of adaptation on happiness is sufficient to 
confirm the hypothesis of happiness superiority of adaptation activity.
Our policy conclusions are mainly two.
• Be cautious with the use of the “gross” happiness metric as a tool for setting reimbursement 
from law suits/litigations. In fact, in estimating happiness for this purpose, the neglect of any 
measurement of adaptation costs may result in an important underestimation of the total 
amount of health loss/damage: adaptation costs should be “added” to the loss in happiness. 
Analogous point, in resource allocation problems, the crude metric of QALY’s seems to 
encompass the results of habituation (in that the elapsing of time usually seems to affect 
positively the scoring). But it seems highly likely that QALY’s fall short of taking account 
both of cognitive adaptation (reflected on the difference between happiness scores and health 
scores/HRQL) and of their costs. 
• Underfinancing, either public of private, of individual coping activities, mainly of the 
psichologic/behavioural type, may compromise the attainment of “potential” adaptation 
(given different illnesses and individual characteristics). Apparently this is the case in almost 
any health service system, where priority is given to “traditional” care services: sticking to 
the strict definition of health adopted by WHO since 1948, may justify more attention to the 
financing of adaptation activity. 
41 Though the evidence on this point is not clear-cut
42 Adaptation is in fact defined as happiness-health.
43 Such use was defined as number of  GP visits, access to specialists, having received 
inpatient hospital care.
44 Results are available upon request.
29The recent release of  Wave 2 Share Data permits a longitudinal analysis that was precluded 
when we first started the empirical part of the study: we are planning to build on this possibility, 
by exploring the health consequences in wave 2 of individuals’ choices made in wave 1.
Finally a more careful study of specific illnesses and of the adaptation behaviour linked to them 
is currently under scrutiny and will be implemented shortly.
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